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What Does a Nation Owe Non-citizens? National Attachments, Perception 
of Threat and Attitudes towards granting 
Citizenship Rights in a Comparative Perspective 
 
Immigration is changing the face of most Western countries. Despite restrictive 
immigration policies, migrant populations in industrialized states have become larger 
and more diversified, changing the ethnic fabric of host societies.  As a result of large 
immigration flows ‘the immigration problem’ has become more relevant than ever as 
the presence of migrants has been transformed from a labor market problem to one of 
national identity (Schnapper, 1994; Fetzer 2000; Favell, 1998; Lahav, 2004).
1
  
The massive presence of immigrants in most Western countries has essentially 
challenged their social and cultural homogeneity and has compelled host societies to 
reconsider the way of thinking about membership and citizenship (Joppke, 1998; 
Freeman, 1986).  As citizenship is an instrument for social closure, the crucial political 
issue in host societies is the kind of distinctions that should be drawn between citizens 
and non-citizens, especially in their access to public goods (i.e. rights) (Brubaker, 
1989, 1992). What sort of membership status should immigrants enjoy in the host 
countries?  
Here we compare attitudes towards the extension of citizenship rights to 
immigrants in four countries: France, Germany (treated as former East and West), the 
USA and Israel.  We do so by using a comprehensive model that includes conceptions 
                                                 
1  Recent studies have shown a dramatic increase in anti-foreigner sentiment in Europe in the last three 
decades (Semyonov, Raijman and Gorodzeisky, 2006) and strong opposition by the native population to 
a multicultural society and granting civil rights to legal migrants (Gijsberts et al., 2004).   
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of national attachments (chauvinism and patriotism) and perceptions of socio-
economic threat to disentangle the specific relevance of each theoretical approach in 
explaining attitudes to access to the goods of citizenship in each of the selected 
countries. 
The choice of countries was based on the different policy regimes implemented 
in the areas of immigration and citizenship in each one of them, which exemplify 
different conceptions of the nation-state in the different social settings. By emphasizing 
the comparative perspective our study goes beyond the conventional single case-study, 
to provide solid ground for understanding how different conceptualizations of the 
nation-state and policies of immigrants' integration affect exclusionary attitudes 
towards migrants' incorporation into the polity of the host societies.  As immigration 
and citizenship regimes are informed by distinctive traditions of nationhood, that is, 
deep-rooted understandings about what constitutes a nation (Brubaker, 1992; Joppke, 
1999), the question that arises is whether different conceptions of the nation-state 
prevailing in host societies affect how individuals' think about granting immigrants 
access to citizenship rights.  
Although most academic work has stressed citizenship as a macro-phenomenon 
of the society, mainly on the institutional level ( see e.g. Shafir and Peled, 2002; 
Aleikinoff,  2003;  Hansen, 2003; Joppke, 1999, 2005;  Brubaker, 1992;  Soysal, 
1994), we suggest that a different way of looking at what citizenship means is through 
the examination of the way individuals (in a given society) define the boundaries of the 
collective: in this specific case, through their level of willingness to share their national 
benefits (e.g. citizenship rights) with out-group populations. In that way analysis of 
public opinion allows us to inquire into the extent to which institutionalized policies 
and public discourses about citizenship and membership are reflected in the attitudes of 
 3 
ordinary people (Svallfors, 1996; Jones and Smith, 2001). As Lahav (2004) has 
suggested, by bringing individuals' attitudes back in we can understand an important 
layer of the social climate surrounding ethnic minorities and migrants in modern 
societies.
2
  
 After presenting the comparative setting we review previous theories and 
research to formulate a comprehensive model that focuses on determinants of 
exclusionary attitudes towards immigrant populations.  Next we describe the data set 
and test the cross-cultural equivalence of the measurement of the latent variables. 
Subsequently, we estimate a structural equation model to examine the effects of the 
individual level and the explanatory variables (chauvinism, patriotism and perception 
of threat) on attitudes towards granting immigrants citizenship rights in the different 
countries. Finally, we discuss the findings in light of sociological theory by stressing 
differences and similarities in the mechanisms underlying the exclusionary attitudes 
towards out-group populations in France, Germany (East and West), the USA and 
Israel.  
 
The Comparative Setting 
The four countries selected exhibit similarities and differences that permit 
significant comparisons. The fundamental similarity is that all four are developed 
Western states, considered the largest immigrant-receiving countries.
3
 Yet because of 
                                                 
2 Bobo and Fox (2003) have also emphasized the need to focus on the micro social processes that 
explain discrimination, which is basically a social psychological phenomenon.  
3   The high percentage of foreign-born population (40%) situates Israel at the top of the list of major 
traditional countries of immigration like the United States (8%) and well above immigration countries in 
Western Europe (e.g. France (10%) and Germany (6%))  (Raijman and Kemp, forthcoming).  
 4 
the different histories of nation building each country approximates a distinct context 
of reception toward immigrants.  
The USA is a very large, pluralistic immigrant society with a long history of 
massive immigration; France, Germany and Israel are three much smaller nation-states 
and culturally more homogeneous. The USA is the classic settler society, with 
immigration forming part of the national myth (Simon and Lynch, 1999). Although 
immigration is a salient fact in countries such as Germany and France it has not been 
central to nation-building. No European country exhibits immigration in the classic 
sense. 
4
 As for Israel, Jewish immigration played a key role in nation-building and the 
national myth. Although in the last decade it has become de facto an immigration 
country – due to the mass arrival of non-Jewish overseas labor migrants – the state 
defines itself as an aliya country but not an immigration country 
5
 (Raijman and Kemp, 
forthcoming). Finally, whereas the USA and the European countries are liberal 
democracies Israel is defined as an ethnic democracy with a strong ethno-religious 
component (Joppke, 2005; Smooha, 1997; Shafir and Peled, 1998). 
Students of ethnic relations tend to agree that the normative context of a society 
as reflected by attitudes, beliefs and actions is greatly influenced by its prevailing 
conception of citizenship and nationality (Baldwin-Edwards and Schain, 1994; Soysal, 
1994; Castles and Miller, 1993; Brubaker, 1989, 1992). Researchers accordingly tend 
to distinguish basic models of incorporation, from the exclusion (folk or ethnic) model 
at one end of the continuum to the inclusion (multicultural) model at the other (Castles 
                                                 
4  For both countries large-scale immigration started after World War II in the 1950s. For a detailed 
analysis of the differences between the countries see e.g.  Brubaker 1992; Joppke, 1999; 2005;  Joppke 
and Rosenhek, 2002. 
5  Jewish immigration is designated by the Hebrew word aliya, which means going up. 
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and Miller, 1993). The USA represents the latter, Germany and Israel the former.  
France has been characterized as a republican model, meaning a community based on 
participation and cultural unity. The nation has been conceived in relation to the 
institutional and territorial frame of the state and the country relies on a universal, 
secular and republican understanding of nationhood and citizenship (Brubaker, 1992; 
Favell, 1998). France is described as a country which combines a civic conception of 
citizenship (e.g. based on jus solis) with an assimilationist model of nationhood in 
which immigrants are more or less forced to become French and lose their distinct 
ethnic and cultural characteristics (Castles and Miller, 1993; Jennings, 2000). Still, 
French nationality is considered a question of voluntary  adherence,
6
 not ethno-national 
belonging as in Germany and Israel.  
Israel and Germany then, can be seen as countries in which the dominant 
definition of the nation is based on community of birth and descent. Both countries rely 
mainly on the system of jus sanguinis to determine the citizenship status of immigrants 
and their descendants.
7
 However since the 3 January 2000 a new law has changed the 
prerequisites for gaining citizenship in Germany. Children of foreign parents obtain 
German citizenship by birth if one of the parents has lived at least eight years in 
                                                 
6   The French state refuses recognition of minorities as such for the purpose of state action. This stand is 
evident in the neglect to collect in census data any kind of ethnic classification, other than distinguishing 
whether the person had any grandparent of non-French origin (Favell, 1998:71). This lack of concern for 
the ethnic categories stands in deep contrast to Germany, Israel, and  the USA.  
7  In Germany, ethnic German immigrants (mostly from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, 
since 1988), are immediately accorded all citizenship rights (Munz, 2002).  However, the vast majority 
of non-German immigrants, even of the second and third generation, still remain outside the community 
of citizens.  The number of foreigners in East Germany was considerably lower than in West Germany, 
and this has not changed since unification. 
 6 
Germany. German law is starting to combine principles of jus sanguinis and jus solis in 
granting citizenship.
 8
  
Israel actively encourages Jewish immigration. According to the law of return 
(1950) and the law of nationality (1952) every Jew has the right to settle in Israel; 
Jewish immigrants can be awarded Israeli citizenship upon arrival.  The current 
migration regime is highly exclusionary toward non-Jews and also forecloses a priori 
any possibility of incorporation for non-Jewish migrants (Shafir and Peled, 2002).
 
Consequently, questions of foreigners’ entitlement to social, political, and economic 
rights are of special significance in Israel since non-Jews are to date excluded from the 
dominant regime of incorporation in the country.
 9
  Although Germany is considered 
Israel's "sister ethnic state" (Joppke, 2005:160), the resilience of ethnic migration in 
Israel stands firm as against its decline in Germany (see Joppke, 2005, chapter 4). 
 In sum, the conception of the nation-state as institutionalized in the different 
policy regimes is decisive in shaping attitudes and public policies. We can relate to the 
four countries as ideal types, which enables us to assess the relationship between 
different forms of national attachments, perceptions of socio-economic threat and 
exclusion of migrants from access to citizenship. Next we present the theoretical 
background and derive explicit hypotheses on the expected impact of chauvinism, 
patriotism and perception of threat on attitudes towards immigrants' access to 
citizenship and rights in the countries under review. 
                                                 
8
  A 1993 law limits the status of ethnic Germans to persons born before 1993. This law may be 
signaling the demise of ethnic-priority migration policy in Germany. By contrast, Jewish priority in 
Israel continues unabated (for a comparison of Israel and Germany on policies on ethnic-priority 
immigration in see Joppke and Rosenhek, 2001).  
9  Non-Jewish labor migrants were recruited during the 1990s, comprising by the beginning of the 21st 
Century some 9 percent of the Israeli labor force (Raijman and Kemp, 2002). 
 7 
Theoretical Background 
Two sets of theoretical explanations are most frequently advanced to explain 
exclusionary attitudes towards immigrants. The first stresses the role of national 
attachments in explaining discrimination against out-group populations; the second 
stresses the role of perceptions of competition on the socio-economic level on 
exclusionary attitudes towards migrants.  
The Role of National Attachments: or 'Does in-group love lead to out-group hate'?
10
  
Social Identity theory (SIT) provides an analytical framework for 
understanding the ways national attachments affect attitudes towards minorities and 
immigrants (Tajfel and Turner, 1986).  According to this approach social identities are 
defined on a comparative basis, which creates a distinction between in-groups and out-
groups.  As every individual strives for a positive social identity, which is apparent in 
the idealization of the in-group and the devaluation of the out-group, the mere 
perception of belonging to two different groups is sufficient to produce in-group 
favoritism and discrimination toward out-groups. 
11
  In the literature the combination 
of the two – in-group favoritism and out-group denigration – is labeled ethnocentrism 
(Campbell and Levine, 1972 ).   
Although ethnocentrism is a common phenomenon in a wide range of societies 
its presence is not universal. For example, Turner (1999) recognizes that individuals 
                                                 
10  See Brewer, 1999. 
11  Tajfel et al. (1971) ascertained the minimal sufficient conditions for in-group favoritism and out-
group discrimination. In their experiments - the so called  "minimal group paradigm” – they were able to 
show that it is  sufficient to divide the subjects into anonymous groups to observe the effect of in-group  
favoritism and out-group discrimination. In their view, processes of group categorization do not only 
serve for structuring the cognitive organization but always lead to discrimination of out-group members. 
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identifying with their in-group may not necessarily tend to contra-identify with out-
groups. Along this line, the necessary condition for the emergence of discrimination of 
out-groups is inter-group competition, this acting as a catalyst for out-group hostility. 
Attitudes towards the in-group are multidimensional and they have been 
conceptualized as national attachments, a general concept that describes an emotional 
bond with an in-group, in this case the nation. Scholars tend to distinguish two types or 
forms of national attachments – chauvinism and patriotism, differing in their 
conception of how the relation between the individual and the nation is structured 
(Kosterman and Feshbach 1989).
12
  Patriotism "requires balancing attachment to and 
consideration for the well-being of one's own group with an inclusive orientation to 
human beings, with respect for the rights and welfare of all people" (Staub, 1997:214 ); 
chauvinism manifests itself in exclusionary attitudes towards out-groups, leading to 
hostility and conflict (Blank and Schmidt 2003; Kosterman and Feshbach 1989; 
Mummendey et al., 2001).
13
 
Chauvinism represents the detrimental facet of positive in-group evaluation and 
is described as "the view that one's ethnic in-group and country are unique and 
                                                 
12 From an analysis of the literature the ambiguous use of the terms nationalism, national identity and 
patriotism becomes evident. 
13   The different effects of nationalism and patriotism on exclusionary attitudes to foreigners derive 
from the different types of inter-group comparisons involved in the two cases. Relational orientation, 
that is, identification with and evaluation of one's nation that implies derogation of other nations leads to 
chauvinism and rejection of the out-group (Mummendey et al, 2001). By contrast a non-relational or 
autonomous orientation corresponds to patriotism, which consists in a national identification and 
positive evaluation which is independent of simultaneous derogation of other nations (Mummendey et 
al. 2001: 161-62). Empirical research supports these two dimensions of national attachments 
(chauvinism and patriotism), which can be empirically distinguished (see e.g. Schatz and Staub, 1996; 
Blank and Schmidt, 2003). 
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superior. This downward comparison of other ethnic groups and countries is combined 
with a blind, uncritical attachment to one's own group and country" (Staub, 1997:214). 
According to this view, people who tend to idealize their nation in relational terms are 
more inclined to feel threatened by outsiders, even though these threats may not be 
real, and therefore are more prone to discriminate out-group populations (Blank and 
Schmidt, 2003).  
By contrast, patriotism reflects an attachment to the nation-state that rejects the 
idealization of the nation and is based on critical consciousness of and critical loyalty 
to the group (Bar-Tal, 1997; Staub, 1997; Schatz and Staub, 1996).
14
 Previous research 
has argued that patriotism can be understood as part of a positive in-group evaluation 
that leads to positive attitudes towards out-group members and is not conducive to their 
derogation (Brewer, 1999). Empirical studies have found a negative correlation (Blank 
et al., 2001; Blank and Schmidt, 2003) or no significant correlation between patriotism 
and the discrimination of foreigners (see e.g. Schatz and Staub, 1997).  
It has been argued that the intensity of national attachments or people's 
identification with a certain group affects the way individuals perceive competition and 
threat from out-group populations (Blank and Schmidt 2003). 
15
 Perceived threat may 
be said to mediate the relationship between national attachments and discriminatory 
attitudes, and operate as a catalyst for the emergence of ethnic exclusionism. 
 
Perceived Threat and Exclusionary Attitudes 
                                                 
14  It has also been labeled, civic or political national pride based on being proud of the country's 
political institutions, economy and social welfare system (Hjerm,  1998).  
15 Some scholars have argued a different causal order, where the presence of actual competition induces 
specific types of national attachments. Whatever the causal order, competition and national attachment 
have been found as reinforcing each other (Coenders et al. 2004:18).  
 11 
Perception of threat from, or fear of, individuals or groups that are in some 
sense (real or imagined) different from oneself or the groups to which one belongs, has 
also been advanced as an important explanation for exclusionary attitudes towards 
foreigners and migrants (Stephan and Stephan, 1985; Quillian, 1995; Esses et al., 2001;  
Semyonov et al., 2002; Raijman et al., 2003; Raijman and Semyonov, 2004; Stephan et 
al., 2005; Kunovich, 2004). 
According to this approach, discriminatory attitudes and prejudice against the 
out-group population can be a result of threats posed to the individual or the group in 
the economic and the social arena (Blalock 1967; Bobo and Hutchings, 1996; Taylor, 
1998; Scheepers et al., 2002). The logic embodied in this framework contends that fear 
and sense of threat mediates the relation between individuals' socio-economic position 
and level of their hostility to out-group populations. For example, citizens of low social 
and economic status fear that more immigrants means more competition over scarce 
resources, that is, fewer jobs, lower wage rates, fewer opportunities for mobility, more 
competition for housing and social services, and rise in crime rates (Gaashlot and 
Togeby, 1995; Quillian, 1995;   Raijman et al., 2003; Raijman and Semyonov, 2004).  
By this logic we expect that perception of threat rationalizes the exclusion of 
immigrants from access to citizenship rights.  
Intensity of national attachments has also been suggested to affect how 
individuals perceive competition and threat from out-group populations (Blank and 
Schmidt, 2003). Therefore we expect the effect of both chauvinism and patriotism on 
exclusionist attitudes towards immigrants to be mediated by perceived socio-economic 
threat (see Appendix 1 for the theoretical model).  
In keeping with theoretical expectations summarized previously (e.g. Bar-Tal, 
1997;  Staub 1997; Blank and Schmidt 2003), we expect opposite effects of 
 11 
chauvinism and patriotism on threat and on exclusionary attitudes  to migrants. 
Specifically, we expect chauvinism to increase feelings of threat, hence to heighten 
opposition to granting migrants citizenship and equal rights. Conversely, we expect 
patriotism to exert a negative effect on the perception of threat, thus decreasing 
opposition to granting immigrants citizenship and equal rights. 
To date, most research has focused on the impact of socio-economic threat on 
exclusionary attitudes (see. e.g. Quillian, 1995; Scheepers, 2002; Raijman and 
Semyonov, 2004; Gijsberts et al., 2004; Semyonov et al., 2006) or on the role of 
national attachments in the derogation of out-groups (Blank et al., 2001; Blank and 
Schmidt, 2003; Mummendey et al., 2001). Only few studies have combined the two 
approaches into one integrative model to explain discriminatory attitudes towards 
immigrants (see e.g. Blank and Schmidt, 2003). This lack of concurrent consideration 
of the two theoretical approaches is surprising given that questions of labor market 
competition and questions of national identity tend to mobilize sentiments against 
immigrants (Schnapper 1994; Fetzer 2000). 16 
Hypotheses  
The theoretical review leads to a series of general propositions on the 
determinants of attitudes towards granting migrants access to citizenship rights.  
First, perception of threat derived from the presence of foreigners is expected 
to decrease with higher levels of patriotism  but to increase with higher levels of 
chauvinism as such feelings tend to ignite in citizens fear of the presence of foreigners 
                                                 
16  In addition, many scholars have focused either on the explanation of nationalistic attitudes 
(chauvinism and patriotism) or the explanation of exclusionary attitudes to minorities and immigrants 
(see e.g. Coenders, 2001;  Gijsberts el al. 2003). These influential studies have suggested that people 
who support nationalist attitudes also tend to support ethnic exclusionism. However, these studies have 
not integrated both phenomena within a single theoretical model in order to test whether national 
identities and exclusionary attitudes are empirically related (see e.g. Blank and Schmidt, 2003;  
Hagendoorn and Poppe, 2003)  
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in their societies and their visualizing them as a threat to their socio-economic well-
being. Second, regardless of patriotism and chauvinism, support for exclusionary 
policies (i.e. denial of citizenship and rights) on migrants is expected to increase with 
level of perceived threat; the higher this is, the more likely are respondents to deny 
citizenship rights to immigrants. Third, we expect that threat will mediate the relations 
between individuals’ socio-economic position and national attachments and attitudes 
towards granting social rights.  
Our purpose is to test for country differences in the effects of chauvinism, 
patriotism and threat on attitudes towards granting citizenship rights to immigrants in 
France, Germany (East and West), the United States and Israel.
17
 The different 
conceptualizations of the nation state and philosophies of immigrants' integration in 
each of the selected countries lead us to expect differences in levels of chauvinism and 
patriotism as well as perception of threat. We may also expect that countries differ not 
only in respect of public views on immigrants (mean levels) but also in respect of the 
mechanisms driving anti-immigrant sentiment at the structural level, that is, the 
relationships between the explanatory and the dependent variables.  
By this logic we expect attitudes towards migrants to be more exclusive in the 
countries defined as ethno-national states (Germany and Israel) and more inclusive in 
the societies identified as close to the multicultural and republican models (the USA 
and France, respectively). Likewise, we expect the effects of chauvinism, patriotism 
and threat to be more intense in ethno-national states but weaker in the countries 
characterized by multicultural or republican regimes of incorporation. 
  
                                                 
17  Different conceptualizations of the nation-state do not necessarily lead to different relationships 
between national pride and exclusion of foreigners. For example, in his comparative study Hjerm found 
that despite differences in nationhood models  no differences appeared in the relationship between 
national pride and exclusion of foreigners (Hjerm, 1998). 
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Methodology 
The recent release of the ISSP (International Social Survey Program) National 
Identity Module collected in 2003 offers us an opportunity to examine comparatively 
the effects of individual-level variables, national attachments (chauvinism and 
patriotism) and socio-economic threat on attitudes towards citizenship rights. The ISSP 
module on national identity (2003) included questions on national identity, 
chauvinism, patriotism and perception of threat, as well as items related to citizenship: 
criteria for citizenship and extension of citizenship rights to immigrants. So for the first 
time we can examine the relationship between different forms of national attachments 
(chauvinism and patriotism) and support for the extension of citizenship rights to non-
citizens. The sample sizes (after calculating missing values and conducting pair-wise 
deletion) were 1,206 in Israel, 785 in Germany (West), 432 in Germany (East), 1,601 
in France and 1,168 in the USA. 
18
 
Dependent Variable 
The rules for acquiring citizenship center on two main principles: territory and 
descent. In the territorial frame of citizenship the relations between the state and its 
population are based on two criteria: birth in the territory and permanent residency. 
The first criterion – that any individual born in a state's territory becomes its permanent 
citizen – is labeled the jus solis principle. The second criterion recognizes as a citizen 
any individual who has established a home or has resided in the state for a long period: 
the jus domicili principle.  The principle of descent is based on the rule of jus 
sanguinis: that citizenship is transferred through family ties (Baubock, 1994).  
                                                 
18  We include in our sample only respondents who are citizens. It is important to note that it is the case 
that foreign-born people who acquired citizenship in all countries are included in the sample. However, 
the lack of information on the year of immigration is a constraint enforced by the ISSP, which did not 
include it.  
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In the ISSP three questions were asked about criteria for citizenship in respect 
of the above three principles. The dependent variable in the analyses was accordingly 
support for the extension of citizenship and rights to immigrants. It was measured as a 
latent variable composed by the following questions (measured on a 1-5 scale from 1= 
strongly disagree to 5= strongly agree): (a) Children born in [country] to parents who 
are not citizens should become citizens of [country] at birth. This question reflects 
support for the jus solis principle; (b) Children born abroad should become [country] 
citizens if at least one of their parents is a citizen of [country]. This question reflects 
support for the jus sanguinis principle; (c) Legal immigrants should have the same 
rights as citizens. This question reflects support for jus domicile principle. 
Confirmatory factor analysis using AMOS 6.0 (Arbuckle 2005) procedures lent 
support to the argument that these items measured the latent variable access to 
citizenship. 
19
 
Explanatory variables 
Following previous research (see e.g. Coenders, 2001; Blank and Schmidt, 
2003) chauvinism is measured here by two items referring to the superiority of one's 
own country and its residents. (1) "The world would be a better place if people from 
other countries were more like the [Country nationality]"; (2) "Generally, [Country] is 
a better country than most other countries". Responses were measured on a five-point 
scale from 1 (disagree) to 5 (agree). Confirmatory factor analysis lent support to the 
argument that these items measured the latent variable chauvinism (see factor loadings 
in Appendix A). 
Patriotism was measured on a 1-4 scale (from 1= strongly disagree to 4= 
strongly agree) based on responses to questions related to civic or political pride: "How 
                                                 
19
 See appendix A for detailed information on factor loadings. 
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proud are you of [country] in each of the following? (a) The way democracy works; (b) 
its social security system; (c) its fair and equal treatment of all groups in society". All 
three indicators measure pride in the democratic institutions and the achievements of 
the welfare state (Blank and Schmidt 2003). A high score on these items is considered 
an indicator of high levels of patriotism. Confirmatory factor analysis lent support to 
the argument that these items measured the latent variable patriotism (see factor 
loadings in Appendix A). 
Perception of threat is a variable measuring perceptions of the consequences of 
the presence of immigrant minorities, especially its association with social problems 
for the host societies, like crime, welfare use, and unemployment, among others. It was 
measured on a 1-5 scale (from 1= strongly disagree to 5= strongly agree) based on 
response to the questions: “How much do you agree or disagree with each of the 
following statements? (a) Immigrants improve [Country's] society by bringing in new 
ideas and culture; (b) immigrants are generally good for [Country's] economy; (c) 
immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in [Country]; (d) immigrants 
increase crime rates; (e) government spends too much on assisting immigrants". The 
first two items were used to construct a latent variable "positive threat", indicating the 
contribution of immigrants to the economic and cultural aspects of society. The last 
three items were used to construct the latent variable "negative threat", which measures 
the negative impact of migrants on the receiving society. Both latent variables were 
used to construct the second-order factor THREAT (Bollen 1989). The "positive 
threat" first-order factor loads negatively on THREAT, whereas the "negative threat" 
first-order factor loads positively on it. Consequently, the substantial meaning of the 
second-order factor THREAT can be understood as a real (negative) sense of threat 
from foreigners (see factor loadings in Appendix A). 
 16 
The background variables included in the analysis are: age (in years), gender 
(male=1), political orientation (1=left), missing data in political orientation (1=0), and 
attend religious services (interval scale from 1 =several times a week to 8=never).
20
 
Respondents' socioeconomic characteristics are education (years of formal schooling) 
and labor force position defined by a set of dummy variables representing white-collar 
employment plus two additional categories: not in the labor force and unemployed. 
Blue-collar employment is the omitted category. Occupations were classified 
according to ISCO. 
21
   
Data analysis 
In Table 1 we present a descriptive overview of the mean values for the 
indicators that compose the latent variables chauvinism, patriotism, socio-economic 
threat and access to citizenship rights for the four countries analyzed. 
22
 The data reveal 
that in general national attachments (both chauvinism and patriotism) are stronger in 
the USA than in the European countries and Israel.  
Chauvinistic feelings were rather high among US respondents ( x =3.7), 
followed by Israeli citizens ( x =3.07).
 23
 The two German populations were the least 
                                                 
20  In France, Germany and the USA the variable "political orientation" was measure on a 1-8 scale, 
where 1=far left and 8=far right. Respondents answering  1 (far left) or 2 (left, center left) received the 
value 1 for left, otherwise zero.  For Israel such a scale is missing so we had to use the variable "party 
voted for" in last elections. We coded the following parties as left: Israel Ahat , Meretz, Am Ehad , 
Hadash. Left =1, otherwise zero). 
21   Information on  background characteristics of country samples and response rates could be seen at 
http://www.gesis.org/en/data_service/issp/data/2003_National_Identity_II.htm 
 
22  ANOVA analysis was conducted in order to test for mean differences between the countries. 
Significant differences were found for all variables with the exception of the general mean for the 
variable citizenship. 
23 As chauvinism was found to be connected to militarism (Kosterman and Fesbach, 1989) these high 
values could possibly be explained by the armed conflicts in which both countries are involved.  In the 
USA, the 9/11 attacks are suggested to have had a strong impact on national identity and attachment by  
giving rise to a clearer definition of  in-group boundaries (Esses, Ovidio and Hodson, 2002:73). The 
average level of chauvinism (measured through the same items) in the USA in 1995 was 3.5. See 
Coenders, 2001:82). 
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chauvinistic ( x =2.74 and x =2.83 in the East and West, respectively), with the French 
slightly more so ( x =2.86).  
24
 
 Patriotism was also high in all countries. Specifically, US  and French citizens 
were very proud in all three indicators of civic or political patriotism ( x =3.88 and 
3.63, respectively).
25
 Contrastingly, Israelis displayed the lowest levels of patriotism as 
evinced by the lower levels of pride reported on all three indicators ( x =2.16). 
26
 The 
distinction between citizens in the two parts of Germany becomes evident in the 
indicators of patriotic pride; in all items East Germans were much less proud than their 
Western counterparts ( x = 3.18 and 3.53 respectively). According to Blank and 
Schmidt (2003) this difference results from the shorter period of reference whereby 
citizens of former East Germany can judge these institutional aspects. 
In all countries respondents were more likely to view the impact of foreigners 
in negative than in positive terms.  With only one exception (foreigners’ impact on 
cultural life) respondents were more likely to express negative than positive views on 
foreigners’ impact on society.  Negative views were most pronounced with regard to 
crime, the labor market and the welfare system (on average over 3 points on a 5-point 
scale across countries)  and least pronounced with regard to foreigners' contribution to 
society in general (economy  and culture) (on average less than 3 points on the scale).  
  The data in Table 1 reveal considerable cross-national variations in the public's 
views of foreigners’ impact on society. Negative views were most intensive in 
                                                 
24 The comparatively lower levels of chauvinistic feelings in Germany can be explained by the 
delegitimation of nationalist feelings after the Second World War that were seen as a negative 
phenomenon that should be restrained (Blank, Schmidt and Westle 2001).  
 
25 Levels of patriotism in 1995 were much lower in the USA, circa 3.0 points (see Coenders 2001:82). 
26  These lower levels of civic pride probably derived from citizens' feelings in connection with the 
retrenchment of the welfare state and the consequent increasing socio-economic inequality during the 
last decade (Shalev, 2000). 
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Germany ( x = 3.71 in the East and 3.50 in the West), followed by the USA ( x =3.18); 
they were less pronounced in France ( x =3.01) and Israel ( x =3.25). 
27
 
Table 1 about here 
 The bottom panel of Table 1 furnishes information on support for immigrants' 
access to citizenship and rights in each of the analyzed countries. Note that despite 
different conceptions of the nation-state and different migration regimes prevalent in 
the four countries, we found no marked differences on average levels of willingness to 
grant citizenship rights to immigrants.
28
 Differences were more evident in citizens' 
attitudes towards the different rules for granting citizenship, although the variation in 
scores was low. 
In all countries the data show higher support for jus sanguinis (“law of blood”) 
and jus solis (“law of the soil”) rules than for the jus domicile principle ("law of 
residence"). This is not surprising given that in almost all the compared countries 
citizenship laws are based on some combination of jus solis and jus sanguinis 
principles.
29
  However, support was relatively stronger for the latter – the ethnic or 
descent rule. Support for jus sanguinis was in fact fairly high in the US ( x  =4.05) and 
Israel ( x  =3.91), followed by Germany (West) ( x  =3.88), France ( x  =3.86) and 
Germany (East) ( x  =3.72).  
                                                 
27  The measurement of socio-economic threat is problematic in the case of Israel. Because respondents 
were asked about immigrants' impact on society, without specifying whether the question referred to 
immigrants arriving under the law of return or to non-Jewish labor migrants, we are not sure what type 
of immigrants the respondents had in mind when they reacted to items measuring socio-economic threat. 
However, in-depth interviews conducted in Israel using the same questions suggest that when asked 
about "immigrants" most respondents relate to non-Jewish migrants, as they designate Olim those of 
Jewish origin who enter under the law of return and are immediately granted citizenship rights.  
28  These findings resemble those of Simon and Lynch (1999) who compared public attitudes in seven 
countries that have had different policies and practices of migration regimes. Despite major differences 
in policies, practices, size of the migrant population and type of immigrants, there is consensus in the 
way immigrants are perceived by the publics in all the analyzed countries (Australia, Canada, France, 
Germany, Great Britain, Japan and the USA). 
29  Even in countries committed to the civic-territorial principle, members' access to citizenship is also 
based on family ties:  the jus sanguinis principle (Joppke, 2005:241). 
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As already stated, one indicator of tolerance for the incorporation of foreigners 
is the predisposition to grant citizenship to newborn children of immigrant parents (i.e., 
second- or third-generation immigrants) by the jus solis principle. This is considered 
the most crucial test of a liberal attitude to foreigners' incorporation into the host 
society, reflecting a more expansive and assimilationist understanding of membership. 
The data show that in all countries citizens' support for locally-born children of 
immigrant parents enjoying access to citizenship is quite high, above 3.7 points in all 
countries.  
The rather high levels of support for access to citizenship for second-generation 
immigrants stands out against the much lower levels of support for conceding rights to 
the first generation of migrants. Support for the jus domicile principle, that is, rights 
based on residency, was low, oscillating between low support in Germany (West) and 
the USA ( x  =2.80 and 2.89 respectively), followed by Israel ( x  =3.01),  to moderate 
in France and Germany (East) ( x  =3.05 and 3.04 respectively).   
Although interesting, the descriptive data do not tell us whether and to what 
extent attitudes towards granting access to citizenship are affected by chauvinism, 
patriotism and socio-economic threat. To learn this we estimate a SEM model that 
allows assessment of the effects of socio-economic characteristics and the explanatory 
variables suggested in the theoretical model.  
 
Structural Equation Model (SEM) 
Although the ISSP data collection is mainly for purposes of international 
comparative studies, attitudes are context-dependent which makes the comparison 
problematic (Svallfors, 1996). To ensure comparability of data it is necessary first to 
establish equivalence of measurement models across cultures (Vandenberg and Lance, 
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2000; Steenkamp and Baumgartner, 1998; Billiet, 2003; De Beuckelaer, 2005).
30
 
Establishing the equivalence of measurements is essential since we must confirm that 
the concepts of chauvinism, patriotism, threat and attitudes towards citizenship rights 
are identical across countries. This is critical for the legitimacy of the comparison of 
relations between these constructs across groups or countries (see e.g. Coenders, 2001; 
Harkness  et al. 2003). The invariance of the latent variables across cultural settings 
could be examined by a test of whether the relationships between these latent variables 
and their indicators are identical across countries or not (see e.g. Billiet, 2003).  
  We started the analysis by testing the conceptual model across the five 
groups. The path model is described in figure 1. In this model we hypothesize that 
patriotism and chauvinism have a direct effect on THREAT  and that THREAT  in turn 
has a direct effect on the variable CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS. Patriotism and chauvinism 
are assumed to have only an indirect effect on CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS  (via 
THREAT) . 
31
 
We estimated this model in a series of multiple group structural equation 
models (MGSEM) (see Bollen 1989 for a detailed overview of MGSEM; Billiet 2003). 
We used the Amos 6.0 program (Arbuckle 2005), which is especially efficient for this 
purpose. MGSEM is a powerful tool for cross-national comparison. It facilitates 
comparison of measurements across nations, and testing whether the meaning of the 
                                                 
30  Researchers differentiate between three types of equivalence: configural, metric and scalar. The 
second (metric) is a necessary condition for the comparability of relationships between constructs. For a 
thorough description of measurement invariance issues see De Beuckelaer, 2005. 
 
31 A series of theoretically postulated socio-demographic and other background variables are regressed 
on the endogenous variables in the model, patriotism, chauvinism, and THREAT. Labor market 
position, age, political orientation and education are assumed to have a direct effect on Patriotism, 
Chauvinism, and THREAT, whereas attendance in religious services and gender are assumed to have a 
direct effect on Chauvinism and Patriotism but not on THREAT. We assume that individual socio-
economic characteristics do not have a direct effect on "CITIZENSHIP  RIGHTS"  but only an indirect 
one via the variables chauvinism, patriotism, and THREAT (see Figure 1).  
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latent constructs is the same across groups, and simultaneously estimating the 
relationships between theoretical constructs.  
If all factor loadings are equal across nations we identify a model of full metric 
invariance
32
 (Billiet and McClendon 2000; Vandenberg and Lance 2000; Steenkamp 
and Baumgartner 1998). If only part of the factor loadings is equal, we identify a 
model of partial metric invariance (Byrne et al., 1989).
33
 We proceed step-wise, setting 
additional constraints on the model. Each of the two models is described in table 2, 
followed by its global fit measures. 
In the first model, which we called the configural invariant model (model A in 
table 2), we compared the model structure across countries, and did not set any 
equality constraints on the factor loadings of the latent variables across countries.
34
 The 
global fit measures were good enough not to reject the model (Bollen 1989; Hu and 
Bentler 1999; Marsh et al., 2004). However, in this model we cannot be sure that the 
meaning of the constructs is the same across countries. 
Table 2 about here 
In the second model (model B in table 2), which we called the measurement 
(metric) invariant model, we set the factor loadings between the latent variables and 
the indicators to be the same across groups. In such a way we guarantee that the 
relations and also the content of the latent variables are the same in the four 
countries.
35
 The global model fit measures suggested that the model cannot be rejected 
(Hu and Bentler 1999; Marsh et al., 2004). Therefore, we concluded that the content of 
                                                 
32  Metric invariance guarantees that the relationship between constructs and indicators is the same 
across groups. This is a necessary condition for the equivalence of meaning and for a meaningful 
comparison of relationships between constructs across groups.  
33  Byrne et al. (1989) also argue that it is enough to have two factor loadings which are equal across 
groups in order to assess equivalence of meaning. 
34 Configural invariance means that the causal structure of the model is the same for all groups but not 
the coefficients themselves, which can vary. 
35
 This is a necessary condition for equivalence of meaning of latent variables across groups.  
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the latent variables is the same across the countries. Now we could confidently 
compare relations between the constructs chauvinism, patriotism, THREAT and 
CITIZENSHIP across countries. Ensuring metric invariance guarantees that such a 
comparison is meaningful.
36
 
 
Determinants of Access to Citizenship and Rights for Immigrants 
Here we discuss the effect of patriotism and chauvinism on perception of threat 
and the effects of chauvinism, patriotism and perception of threat on attitudes towards 
granting citizenship rights to migrants in France, Germany (East and West), the USA 
and Israel.  The unstandardized regression coefficients for the model are presented in 
Table 3.
37
 
As outlined in the theoretical background, because chauvinism and patriotism 
differ in their conception of how the relation between the individual and the nation is 
structured  (Blank et al., 2001) we also expected them to differ in the way they unleash 
perceptions of socio-economic threat from immigrants' presence.  In line with the 
                                                 
36 The unstandardized factor loadings of the indicators of the latent variables for model B are 
presented  in Appendix A. As the results show, the indicators display strong and significant loadings on 
their corresponding latent variables (chauvinism, patriotism, thr+, thr- and CITIZENSHIP  RIGHTS) 
across countries. This guarantees that the constructs have the same meaning over the countries. 
Furthermore, thr+ loads negatively on the second-order latent variable threat, and thr- loads on it 
positively. Consequently, the substantial meaning of the second-order factor threat can be understood as 
a real (negative) feeling of threat from foreigners. 
 
37  For reasons of parsimony we will not discuss the effects of the exogenous variables on  national 
attachments and perceptions of threat. The data in Appendix B  and Table 3 suggest that in all countries 
chauvinism, patriotism and perception of threat were associated with individual characteristics in largely 
predictable ways.  
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literature, we found that chauvinism and patriotism have significant but opposite 
effects on the perception of socio-economic threat from immigrants' presence. Whereas 
chauvinistic feelings have a positive effect and increase perceptions of threat, patriotic 
feelings have a negative effect thus reducing the feelings of threat derived from the 
presence of foreigners.  
The positive effect of chauvinism was the most pronounced in the USA and 
Israel (b=.665 and .602, respectively), the least pronounced in Germany (East) 
(b=.284) and Germany (West) (b=.3334), with France in the middle (b=.475). The 
strong and significant effect of chauvinism on threat in Israel and the USA suggests 
that feelings of "country superiority" coupled with the country's involvement in armed 
conflicts might have a much greater impact on the way they activate the sense of threat 
derived from the presence of foreigners in the country. 
38
 The negative effect of 
patriotism on threat was more pronounced in the USA (b= -.614), behind which came 
France (b= -.510), Israel (b=-.505) and Germany (West= -.416 and East= -.361).  
As expected, socio-economic threat exerted a negative effect on 
"CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS" in all countries. Namely, people with a higher level of sense 
of threat were less willing to grant citizenship rights to immigrants. The data show that 
the direct and negative effect of threat on "CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS" differed across 
countries. It was moderate in Israel (b= -.476) and the USA (b=-.594), strongest in 
France (b= -.902) and less so by Germany (East) (b=-.772), and Germany (West) (b= -
.664).  
Because we assume that the effects of patriotism and chauvinism are mediated 
by the perception of threat we proceed next to analyze the total (direct and indirect) 
                                                 
38 Li and Brewer have argued that the 9/11 attacks resulted in a distinct increase in expressions of 
national identification and unity in the USA (2004:728). 
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effects of these variables on willingness to grant immigrants access to citizenship and 
rights (see Table 4).  
Table 4 about here 
The data in Table 4 show that in all countries patriotism had a positive total 
effect on citizenship, with chauvinism exerting a negative and significant effect on 
attitudes towards granting immigrants access to citizenship rights. 
39
 Namely, the 
higher the feelings of patriotism, the higher the willingness to grant citizenship rights 
to foreigners. By contrast, the higher respondents' chauvinistic attitudes, the lower the 
willingness to grant such rights.  
These findings lead to several conclusions.  First, the opposite (direct) effects 
of chauvinism and patriotism on threat and (indirect effects on) support for granting 
citizenship rights to immigrants in all countries confirm the need to distinguish the two 
dimensions of national attachments: chauvinism and patriotism (see e.g. Coenders, 
2001; Schmidt and Blank 2003).  
Second, chauvinism does not directly lead to the rejection and exclusion of 
immigrants. It is rather an indirect causal effect through the perception of threat. As 
suggested by Brewer (1999), in-group favoritism is fertile ground for perceived threat 
and antagonism to out-groups. In other words, the need to justify in-group values in the 
form of moral superiority to others increases the perception that immigrants are a threat 
to the interests of the in-group, leading to the exclusion of immigrants from access to 
citizenship and rights.  
Third, as expected the stronger the respondents' degree of patriotism, the lower 
the perception of socio-economic threat posed by the presence of foreigners, and 
consequently the higher the disposition to grant immigrants access to the goods of 
                                                 
39 Only in the USA did both patriotism and chauvinism have substantial larger direct effects, negative 
and positive respectively, on the variable "CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS".   
 
 25 
citizenship. As patriotism is based on a humanist moral concept (see Schwartz, 1992), 
it is associated with support for democratic principles which in turn favor cultural and 
societal diversity. Therefore, patriotism is connected with only weak feelings of threat, 
or none at all, hence only to a slight tendency to exclusionism, or its complete absence 
(see e.g. Blank et al., 2001).  
 
Conclusions 
 In this paper we tested  the effects of national attachments (patriotism and 
chauvinism) and perception of threat on citizens' willingness to concede citizenship 
rights to immigrants in France, Germany (West and East), the USA and Israel. Because 
the selected countries differ in their immigration policies and philosophies of 
immigrants' integration, we expected them also to differ in the ways citizens view 
immigrants' access to citizenship and rights. However, contrary to our expectations, 
and despite their marked differences in migration policies and conceptions of 
nationhood, no significant differences were found in attitudes towards the allocation of 
citizenship rights to immigrants in the countries under review.  
Citizens' attitudes towards criteria for acquiring citizenship reflect in all 
countries a combination of two main principles: jus sanguinis and jus solis. Thus both, 
descent and territory (birth but not residence) are identified as principles for social 
inclusion, and this was true even in the ethno-national states.  As our findings suggest, 
the first generation of immigrants were considered "outsiders" in all countries as 
citizens were resistant to accept foreigners as equal members in their societies. 
Contrastingly, willingness to grant citizenship to the second generation was widely 
supported in all countries. Based on these findings, we can conclude that different 
conceptualizations of the nation-state – at the macro-level – do not necessarily lead to 
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different attitudes towards immigrants' inclusion/exclusion at the micro-level of 
analysis.  
However, regarding the strength of the relationship between explanatory and 
dependent variables we uncover some interesting and unexpected differences among 
the four countries, which we summarize in Table 5. 
Our theoretical expectation was that the effects of national attachments and 
perceptions of threat on respondents' attitudes towards granting migrants citizenship 
rights would be stronger in ethno-national states and weaker in countries characterized 
by multicultural or republican regimes.  However, our analysis suggests that contrary 
to our expectations, the effects of both chauvinism and patriotism on willingness to 
grant citizenship rights to immigrants were rather low in Germany and Israel – the two 
ethno-national states, and strongest in France and the USA – which stand for 
republican and multicultural models of incorporation, respectively. Furthermore, the 
effects of threat on exclusion of immigrants from citizenship rights was weaker in 
Israel (ethnic democracy) but stronger in the liberal democratic countries. 
What then are the mechanisms driving these differences among the different 
receiving societies? Our findings imply that the French republican-held concept of 
citizenship, which presupposes that without a common culture and a sense of common 
identity the integrity of the nation could be threatened, might be exclusionary toward 
foreigners (Jennings, 2000:581). Indeed, some scholars have suggested that despite the 
republican model and its cultural and ethnic diversity French citizens might fear the 
loss of national identity, and therefore tend to be less tolerant of migrants' 
incorporation into French society (2000:576).
 40
    
                                                 
40  Indeed, Muslim immigration and the viability of their integration into French society has been lately a 
focus of great concern in the country. According to de Wenden (1998) immigrants in France are mostly 
identified with Muslims; these also perceived by the native population as fundamentalist, anachronistic 
and dangerous.  Furthermore, France has the highest percentage of Muslim population in Europe (circa 
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Table 5 about here 
The pattern of moderate and strong effects of national attachments and 
perception of threat on granting citizenship rights in the USA tends to resemble that in 
France. Although the USA has made the immigrant experience part of its national 
identity, the issue of illegal immigration and the country's changing demographic 
structure are also factors that can ignite threat and lead to the exclusion of immigrants 
from the access to citizenship. For example, Burns and Gimpel (2000:203) argued that 
labor market competition resulting from a generous immigration policy can also result 
in deep hostility toward immigrants as they are perceived as competitors in the social 
and economic spheres. Furthermore, as Joppke has suggested, the public's views on 
foreigners cannot be dissociated from America's longstanding and unresolved race 
problem (1996:454).
41
 
The lower impact of national attachments on exclusionary attitudes towards 
foreigners in Germany (both West and East) confirms that in this country the 
delegitimation of nationalist feelings (after 1945) affect  both, the sense of threat 
caused by immigrants' presence and willingness to grant them access to citizenship 
rights. By contrast, the rather strong effect of perception of threat on exclusionary 
attitudes towards granting citizenship rights to immigrants was high, especially in 
former East Germany, where the percentage of foreigners is rather low. This finding 
illustrates that even in the absence of actual threat (low number of foreigners in former 
East Germany) it is the perceived threat (Semyonov et al., 2004) – that results in a 
                                                                                                                                              
3.7 percent in 2003). Although Germany also has a large Turkish immigrant population, one has to take 
into account that the Islamic orientations of Turkish immigrants in Germany are perceived as less radical 
than those of the Algerian and Moroccan immigrants in France. 
41 The relatively  high effects of the variable threat in the USA can also be explained as a "9/11" effect as 
the terrorist attacks committed by Muslim immigrants heightened the identification of foreigners –
especially those of Muslim background – with the threat of America's values (Li and Brewer  2004). 
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higher disposition to exclude immigrants from access to the goods of citizenship 
("xenophobia without strangers").  
 Finally, the lower effect of perceptions of socio-economic threat on attitudes 
towards granting citizenship rights to immigrants in Israel could be explained by the 
strong exclusionary policy displayed by this nation-state toward non-Jewish migrants. 
Although non-national workers have become an integral part of the Israeli economy, 
they are excluded from the dominant regime of incorporation in the country. They hold 
the least desirable jobs, suffer from the worst working conditions, and (unlike the 
situation in the other countries), and do not benefit from the welfare system and union 
protection accorded Israeli citizens. Furthermore, they have no possibility for 
becoming citizens. Perhaps the citizens' perception of secure "closed doors" for non-
ethnic migrants in Israel is expressed through the relatively lower impact of socio-
economic threat on their willingness to grant access to citizenship rights to migrants. 
 So we confront the paradox that in countries that are liberal democracies and 
tend to display a civic or republican model of nationhood, the effect of threat on the 
citizens' willingness to grant citizenship rights is stronger than in Israel, an ethno-
national state with a strong religious exclusivist component. Therefore, it can be said 
that in societies characterized by relatively "open doors" to immigrants, and relatively 
easy access to citizenship, yet at the same time by a strong emphasis on assimilation 
(e.g. France), the effect of national attachments and perception of threat might be much 
stronger than in countries with secure "closed doors" and restrictive admission policies 
and citizenship regimes for non-ethnic migrants (i.e. Israel).  
 We suggest that future research address this intriguing paradox and elucidate 
(1) the complex ways whereby individuals construct boundaries and social identities in 
specific socio-economic and political contexts, and (2) the ways these impinge on 
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perceptions of and behaviors toward out-groups. To achieve this aim we should 
combine survey data with qualitative data (e.g. in-depth interviews, focus groups) that 
would allow deeper understanding of how national attachments and socio-economic 
threat intertwine in the explanation of exclusionary attitudes towards immigrants in 
different social settings.  
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Table 1: Chauvinism, patriotism, socio-economic threat and access to citizenship rights  
 France Germany (East) Germany 
(West) 
Israel  USA 
Chauvinism  ( x ) 
-The world would be a better place if people from other countries   
  were more like the[Country nationality] 
-Generally,[Country] is better than most other   
  countries 
2.86 (1.04) 
2.54(1.18) 
 
3.16(1.15) 
 
2.74 (0.92) 
2.56(1.03) 
 
2.91(1.04) 
2.83 (0.95) 
2.61(1.03) 
 
3.03(1.09) 
3.07 (1.00) 
2.74(1.13) 
 
3.41(1.19) 
3.70 (0.86) 
3.27(1.10) 
 
4.13(0.90) 
Patriotism   ( x ) 
-How proud: The way democracy works 
- How proud: Its social security system 
- How proud: Its fair and equal treatment of all groups in society 
3.63 (0.66) 
3.52(0.82) 
3.99(0.86) 
3.33(0.87) 
3.18 (0.60) 
3.19(0.68) 
3.27(0.77) 
3.10(0.79) 
3.53(0.61) 
3.61(0.80) 
3.64(0.82) 
3.37(0.74) 
2.16 (0.69) 
2.38(0.93) 
2.09(0.95) 
2.02(0.92) 
3.88(0.59) 
4.19(0.68) 
3.55(0.84) 
3.94(0.81) 
Positive threat   ( x ) 
-Immigrants are generally good for [Country’s] economy 
-Immigrants improve[Country nationality] society by bringing in   
   new ideas and cultures 
3.04(1.09) 
3.10(1.16) 
2.99(1.23) 
3.04(0.86) 
3.35(0.96) 
2.77(1.01) 
2.86(0.85) 
3.13(0.92) 
2.62(0.99) 
2.76 (1.06) 
2.71(1.18) 
2.80(1.25) 
 
2.68(0.87) 
2.80(0.99) 
2.56(0.96) 
 
Negative threat  ( x ) 
 - Immigrants increase crime rates 
- Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born    
   in [Country] 
- Government spends too much money assisting immigrants 
 Threat Index  ( x ) 
 
3.01(1.18) 
3.10(1.38) 
2.56(1.34) 
 
3.37(1.35) 
 
3.02(1.06) 
3.71(0.92) 
3.74(1.01) 
4.47(1.11) 
 
4.03(0.97) 
 
3.45(0.81) 
3.50(0.90) 
3.62(1.01) 
3.12 (1.14) 
 
3.82(1.05) 
 
3.25(0.79) 
3.25(1.08) 
3.32(1.28) 
3.33(1.41) 
 
3.09(1.26) 
 
3.05(0.95) 
3.18(0.88) 
2.83(1.04) 
3.19(1.13) 
 
3.52(1.08) 
 
2.98(0.79) 
Citizenship  ( x ) 
- Children born in [Country] to parents who are not citizens should   
   have the right to become [Country nationality] citizens. Jus solis 
 - Children born abroad should have the right to become [Country   
   nationality] citizens if at least one of their parents is a [Country   
   nationality] citizen. Jus sanguinis 
- Legal immigrants to [Country] who are not citizens should have the  
  same rights as [Country nationality] citizens. Jus domicil 
3.54(1.02) 
3.73(1.28) 
 
3.86(1.09) 
 
 
3.05(1.40) 
3.47 (0.81) 
3.67(0.99) 
 
3.72(0.92) 
 
 
3.04(1.20) 
3.51(0.79) 
3.90(0.92) 
 
3.88(0.81) 
 
 
2.80(1.22) 
3.54 (0.87) 
3.73(1.25) 
 
3.91(1.07) 
 
 
3.01(1.25) 
3.59(0.73) 
3.83(1.06) 
 
4.05(0.74) 
 
 
2.89(0.21) 
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Table 2: Global fit measures for (a) configural invariance model; (b) 
measurement (metric) invariance model 
 Chi square / degrees 
of freedom 
CFI PCLOSE RMSEA SRMR 
MODEL A 
 
Configural 
invariance 
 
 
 
3.1 
 
 
0.95 
 
 
1.00 
 
 
0.02 
 
 
0.03 
MODEL B 
 
 
Measurement 
(metric) invariance 
model 
 
 
 
3.3 
 
 
 
0.94 
 
 
 
1.00 
 
 
 
0.02 
 
 
 
0.04 
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Table 3: Unstandardized regression coefficients of social-structural variables on 
theoretical variables in the partially structural invariant model (MGSEM of  Israel , 
Germany (West), Germany (East), France and USA) 
Variables Israel 
Germany 
(West) 
Germany 
(East) 
France USA 
 B S.E B S.E B S.E B S.E B S.E 
           
threat <-- left .000  .000  .000  -.529* .055 .000  
threat <-- age -.008* .002 .005* .002 .001 .002 .004* .001 .002 .001 
threat <-- educ -.028* .008 -.040* .008 -.054* .011 -.030* .005 -.024* .009 
threat <-- out .204* .080 .032 .067 -.105 .094 -.039 .078 -.078 .064 
threat <-- unemployd1 -.174 .121 -.182 .115 -.209* .109 .004 .106 -.152 .117 
threat <-- white .142 .081 -.036 .067 -.124 .095 -.129 .074 -.194* .059 
threat <-- vote_mis -.188* .059 .022 .049 .048 .064 -.131* .050 -.029 .192 
threat <-- patr -.505* .082 -.416* .066 -.361* .078 -.510* .052 -.614* .084 
threat <-- chauv .602* .077 .334* .043 .284* .060 .475* .037 .665* .068 
cit. <-- threat -.476* .046 -.664* .057 -.772* .071 -.902* .038 -.594* .043 
* P<0.05 
cit.=citizenship; thr=threat; patr=patriotism; chauv=chauvinism 
 
 
 
 
 39 
Table 4. Unstandardized total effects of patriotism and chauvinism on citizenship  
rights by country (SE in brackets estimated by the bootstrap procedure) 
 
Total effects Patriotism Chauvinism 
   
Israel 
.240* 
(.089) 
-.287* 
(.095) 
Germany (West) 
.276* 
(.053) 
-.222* 
(.039) 
Germany (East) 
.279* 
(.070) 
-.219* 
(.051) 
France 
.460* 
(.052) 
-.428* 
(.036) 
USA 
.364* 
(.058) 
-.395* 
(.050) 
 
 
* P<0.05 
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Table 5. Summary of strength of effects on exclusionary attitudes to 
migrants by country 
 
Total Effects Patriotism Chauvinism Threat 
    
 
Israel 
 
Low Low Moderate 
 
Germany (West) 
 
Low Low High 
 
Germany (East) 
 
Low Low High 
 
France 
 
Moderate Moderate Very High 
 
USA 
 
Moderate Moderate High 
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Appendix A: Unstandardized factor loadings of indicators on latent variables or on 
socio-demographic characteristics in the partially structural invariant model (MGSEM 
of Israel (total population), Germany (West), Germany (East), France and USA 
 Israel 
Germany 
(West) 
Germany 
(East) 
France USA 
 B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Factor loadings           
V59 <-- cit. 1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  
V60 <-- cit. .678* .024 .678* .024 .678* .024 .678* .024 .678* .024 
V61 <-- cit. 1.081* .036 1.081* .036 1.081* .036 1.081* .036 1.081* .036 
V50 <-- thr- 1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  
V54 <-- thr- 1.154* .029 1.154* .029 1.154* .029 1.154* .029 1.154* .029 
V51 <-- thr+ 1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  
V53 <-- thr+ 1.022* .022 1.022* .022 1.022* .022 1.022* .022 1.022* .022 
V22 <-- chauv 1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  
V21 <-- chauv 1.274* .043 1.274* .043 1.274* .043 1.274* .043 1.274* .043 
V35 <-- patr 1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  
V29 <-- patr .821* .035 .821* .035 .821* .035 .821* .035 .821* .035 
V26 <-- patr .989* .039 .989* .039 .989* .039 .989* .039 .989* .039 
V52 <-- thr- 1.255* .031 1.255* .031 1.255* .031 1.255* .031 1.255* .031 
V50 <-- chauv .216* .026 .216* .026 .216* .026 .216* .026 .216* .026 
V50 <-- attend1 .007 .013 -.021 .014 .072* .022 -.004 .010 -.007 .011 
* P<0.05 
cit.=citizenship; thr=threat; patr=patriotism; chauv=chauvinism 
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Appendix B: Unstandardized regression coefficients of socio-demographic variables 
on Patriotism and Chauvinism (MGSEM of  Israel , Germany (West), Germany (East), 
France and USA) 
Effects Israel 
Germany 
West 
Germany 
East 
France USA 
 B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
           
patr <-- white .040 .070 .118 .070 .114 .096 .145* .065 .079 .051 
patr <-- unemployd1 -.029 .105 -.029 .115 -.146 .107 .100 .093 -.174 .097 
patr <-- out .044 .071 .019 .070 .132 .094 .147* .068 -.007 .056 
patr <-- educ -.016* .006 .026* .007 .005 .010 .014* .004 .004 .006 
patr <-- sex -.071 .043 -.111* .045 -.091 .062 -.087* .034 -.150* .035 
patr <-- age .000 .001 .003 .002 .000 .002 .001 .001 .006* .001 
patr <-- attend1 .004 .009 -.024* .010 -.024 .018 -.011 .007 -.025* .008 
patr <-- left -.054 .060 .061 .054 .090 .080 -.117* .040 -.172* .035 
chauv <-- white -.130 .076 -.108 .089 -.114 .118 -.200* .082 .068 .064 
chauv <-- unemployd1 -.008 .114 .163 .146 .047 .130 -.097 .117 .055 .122 
chauv <-- out -.022 .077 .079 .089 .074 .115 -.176* .086 -.048 .070 
chauv <-- educ -.041* .007 -.036* .009 -.039* .013 -.036* .005 -.063* .008 
chauv <-- sex .039 .046 -.051 .058 -.087 .075 -.169* .043 -.163* .043 
chauv <-- age .000 .001 .000 .002 .002 .002 .006* .002 .006* .001 
chauv <-- attend1 -.077* .010 -.027* .013 .048* .022 .002 .009 -.018* .009 
chauv <-- left -.197* .064 -.174* .069 -.248* .098 -.310* .051 -.214* .044 
patr <-- vote_mis -.039 .052 -.215* .051 -.064 .073 -.322* .042 -.034 .160 
chauv <-- vote_mis -.146* .057 -.037 .064 -.058 .090 .022 .052 -.036 .201 
* P<0.05 
patr=patriotism; chauv=chauvinism  
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Figure 1: The full model 
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